For Whom the Tunnel Be Tolled: A Four-Factor Model for Explaining Willingness-to-Pay Tolls by Yusuf, Juita-Elena (Wie) et al.
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
School of Public Service Faculty Publications School of Public Service
2014
For Whom the Tunnel Be Tolled: A Four-Factor
Model for Explaining Willingness-to-Pay Tolls
Juita-Elena (Wie) Yusuf




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/publicservice_pubs
Part of the Infrastructure Commons, Public Affairs Commons, Public Policy Commons, and the
Transportation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Public Service at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
School of Public Service Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Repository Citation
Yusuf, Juita-Elena (Wie); O'Connell, Lenahan; and Anuar, Khairul A., "For Whom the Tunnel Be Tolled: A Four-Factor Model for
Explaining Willingness-to-Pay Tolls" (2014). School of Public Service Faculty Publications. 1.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/publicservice_pubs/1
     1 
For Whom the Tunnel be Tolled: Toward a Four-Factor Model for Explaining 
Willingness-to-Pay Tolls 
 
Juita-Elena ( Wie) Yusuf*(a)  
Lenahan O’Connell(b)  
Khairul A. Anuar(c)  
 
*Corresponding Author  
2096 Constant Hall, Old Dominion University, Norfolk VA 23504, USA  
Tel: +1 757 683 4437 E-mail address : jyusuf@odu.edu  
 
(a) Assistant Professor, Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration, Old Dominion 
University, Norfolk, VA, USA  
(b) Senior Research Associate, Kentucky Transportation Center, University of Kentucky, 
Lexington, KY, USA  






This research examines citizen acceptance of tolls and road pricing, and specifically focuses on 
determinants of the individual’s expressed willingness-to-pay tolls to use a tunnel express lane 
that would be free of traffic delays. We answer the research question “What factors influence 
citizens’ willingness-to-pay tolls” by empirically estimating a four factor model of willingness-
to-pay: (a) direct benefit to the respondent; (b) relative cost over time; (c) community concern; 
and (d) political and environmental liberalism. We use data about citizen perceptions from the 
Life in Hampton Roads Survey, a survey of residents of Hampton Roads, Virginia. We find that 
willingness-to-pay is primarily driven and motivated by self-interest, through a balancing of 
benefit to cost relative to individual income and frequency of use. . In addition, concern for the 
community also contributes to willingness-to-pay tolls. The individual’s perception of 
government’s trustworthiness, a reflection of political and environmental beliefs, also influences 
the extent to which an individual is willing to pay tolls. Keywords: Willingness-to-pay, tolls, 
road pricing, tunnel congestion 
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1. Introduction  
 For most urban areas in the U.S., traffic congestion and subsequent travel delays have 
become significant problems.  For example, statistics from the Texas Transportation Institute 
indicate that congestion, measured as delay per commuter (in hours) has increased from 16 hours 
in 1982 to 38.0 hours in 2011 (Shrank, Eisele, & Lomax, 2012). In recent years, there has been a 
significant and wide-spread interest in the use of tolls and other forms of road pricing as a source 
of funding, a means of managing congestion, and a way of providing additional traveler options. 
Tolls have become increasingly attractive to state and local governments in the current fiscal 
environment in which they face significant demands for services, but possess limited (even 
decreasing) resources to meet these demands. Many states in the U.S. are experiencing shortfalls 
in transportation funding, along with growing needs for surface transportation system 
improvements to manage congestion. “Tolling and road pricing have become part of 
contemporary transportation planning and policy making vernacular out of the need to address 
traffic congestion and infrastructure funding short-falls” (Zmud & Arce, 2008, p. 49). 
 Despite the potential advantages of tolling, much of the existing empirical research in 
transportation indicates that public acceptance of tolls has been low. Yet there are reasons to 
believe that latent support for tolls may exist among the general public, as tolling can confer 
benefits desired by many voters, including the many who rarely drive or infrequently use the 
tolled facility. Among the potential benefits, revenue for needed infrastructure and public 
transportation projects, less congestion for drivers, less pollution and reduced auto dependence 
for environmentalists and smart growth advocates, just to mention a few. Thus, the benefits are 
many and only those who pay the toll will bear the cost. The latter, of course, gain the benefit of 
reduced congestion and faster travel.   
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 This research examines the willingness of residents in a community ( Hampton Roads, 
Virginia) to pay a $3.00 toll to access a tunnel express lane that would be free of traffic delays 
the majority of the time.  We answer the research question “what factors influence citizens’ 
expressed willingness-to-pay a toll” by empirically estimating a four-factor model of 
willingness-to-pay. Our approach is similar to that of Hamilton (2012), who studied the factors 
predicting support for congestion pricing in three European cities. He looked at the impact of 
five factors on support: self-interest, fairness, political ideology, trust in government, and 
previous experience with congestion pricing. Our model includes measures of three of these 
factors. Our model also includes measures of community concern along with measures of the 
direct benefit to the respondent (e.g., congestion relief and commute time), trust in government, 
and political and environmental liberalism. We use data about citizen perceptions from the Life 
in Hampton Roads Survey, which is a survey of 700 residents of the Hampton Roads region in 
Southeastern Virginia  
 Our study uses a textbook static model of congestion pricing with homogeneous values of 
time, thus assuming a single value of time and a single road link.  We do not include a direct 
measure of the value of time in our model, as we assume that drivers will use the tunnel at 
different times for a variety of reasons and the value of time will in all likelihood vary with the 
reasons for travel. Moreover, some supporters of a toll may not use it very often, if at all (Gaunt, 
Rye, & Allen, 2007; Jaensirisak, Wardman, & May, 2005). We do however have a measure of 
individual income; and, as research on the value of time suggests, residents with more income 
are more likely to be willing to pay the toll. But many other factors can influence support for a 
toll. It is well-documented that the value of time varies by trip purpose, day of week, and type of 
traffic encountered, which is to say that the value of time is more than a function of income and 
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chronological time saved (Hamilton, 2012; Wardman & Nicolás Ibáñez, 2012). And, of course, 
many low income residents of a city, such as those who rely on transit, may support a toll 
because they are not likely to pay the toll or pay it infrequently and the toll, itself, can serve as an 
alternative to a possible tax increase for infrastructure that they would have to pay. Others with a 
low value of time may support the toll for political or environmental reasons (Eliasson & 
Jonsson, 2011; Jaensirisak, et al., 2005). Thus, this study is designed to capture the factors 
beyond income and time saved that lead to support for a toll. A city seeking to impose a toll can 
design its campaign for support so that it clearly informs each subgroup of residents of their 
specific benefits.  Given the increasing reliance on user fees and user charges by governments in 
the U.S., this study has implications for the research on citizen acceptance of (and willingness to 
pay) similar fees or charges.  
 After providing some background information on the issue of tolling, we discuss the 
importance of public support. We then present our four-factor model of support for tolling 
followed by our study methods and results. The conclusion offers implications for future efforts 
to gain public support for tolls, road pricing and similar user fees. 
 
1.1  Some background on tolling and road pricing  
 According to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration, 
as of January 1, 2011, toll facilities in the U.S. totaled 5,365 miles (Federal Highway 
Administration, 2011).  These toll facilities, which range from congested urban facilities to toll 
roads linking rural areas, include not only highways, but also tunnels, bridges, and ferries.  The 
tolling structures vary widely, from multi-tiered price structures with discounts according to 
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frequency of use, carpooling, and time of day discounts, to flat rate structures in which the only 
differentiation is made on the basis of the number of axles per vehicle. 
Tolls are a direct user fee charged for use of road capacity and services to the motorist. 
Toll financing has a long tradition in the U.S. as a supplemental source of revenue to meet 
transportation needs. In the late nineteenth century, toll road development tapered off as toll 
evasion as well as rail travel increased. However, by the 1930s, some states began developing 
public toll road programs to respond to growth in automobile ownership, the rising needs of 
commerce, and the absence of significant Federal-aid for highways. While private tollway 
companies dominated the "turnpike" industry in the earlier centuries, the toll facilities of the 
twentieth century have largely been authorized, constructed, and managed by quasi-public 
authorities established by state and local governments. The pursuit of toll roads declined after 
1956, when the Federal Highway Act established a Federal gasoline tax to support the interstate 
highway system and prohibited tolling on new, federally-funded highways. 
In recent decades, increased transportation needs and public funding constraints have 
fueled new interest in tolls as a revenue source to support transportation investment. The interest 
in toll roads today is an outgrowth of federal legislation giving states greater flexibility to 
implement tolling and road pricing. But it also reflects the multiple benefits derived from tolling, 
of which three are prominent: (a) creation of adequate funds for urgently needed projects; (b) a 
shift in the burden of capital, operating, and maintenance costs to specific users; and (c) the 
generation of an immediate and direct source of revenue to discharge bond and other financing 
obligations (Rusch, 1984).  There is also an  environmental argument for road pricing in that it 
may  reduce driving and its related externalities.  While not commonly acknowledged as a key 
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driver for imposing tolls, these environmental benefits have sometimes been included as part of 
the case for a toll project.   
The three prominent financial goals of tolling do not always coincide with the goals of 
reducing congestion.  However, as Santos and Fraser (2006, p. 266) note, it is common  “to 
confuse schemes that were designed to finance infrastructure with schemes designed to reduce 
congestion.”  The economic case for road pricing argues that absent pricing at the point of use, 
the demand for road use will exceed its capacity, resulting in congestion (Vickrey, 1969).  This is 
true for most tolling cases where road pricing and imposition of tolls do not automatically lead to 
expanded capacity. As such, tolling that was originally seen as a method for reducing congestion, 
may also be seen as a source of funds for infrastructure. Similarly, tolling schemes intended to 
finance transportation projects may also, with appropriate structuring of toll rates, become traffic 
demand management tools.  Thus, in today’s transportation environment, traffic congestion and 
growing resource constraints are driving states towards considering toll pricing as not only a tool 
to manage demand but also to ensure a sufficient revenue stream. This shift in purpose has made 
tolls not just a simple financial calculation but a potentially powerful instrument of public 
policy— of interest to constituencies with divergent interests. But, this shift in emphasis means 
the toll must be priced high enough to discourage many drivers from using the tolled facility, 
leading to the conundrum that as the toll goes up political support for it goes down. It is 
necessary, therefore, to identify and reach out to potential supporters of a toll (in addition to 
those whose value of time is high enough to pay the toll) if sufficient public support is to be 
found for instituting the toll. 
In this study, we focus on the public’s willingness-to-pay tolls for the direct benefit of 
using an express lane that is free of traffic delays the majority of the time.  While this implies an 
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explicit purpose of using tolls for congestion management, as the previous discussion suggests, it 
is often difficult for the public (and policymakers) to separate the congestion purpose from the 
financial purpose of the toll.  As such, our study does not confine itself solely to the congestion 
benefits of the toll.  
 
1.2  The importance of public support for tolls 
Against a backdrop of growing transportation needs and declining resources, the net 
result of changing policies and technological developments has been the need for increasing 
public and political acceptance of toll financing for roads, bridges and tunnels.  However, 
popular discourse suggests that the public is opposed to tolling and road pricing.  Similarly, 
research using public opinion data has generally found low levels of support for  a variety of 
tolling mechanisms (Schade & Schlag, 2003).  This public opposition poses challenges to 
advocates of tolls and road pricing, despite the increasing awareness of the need for toll revenues 
and the need to address congestion and traffic delays. While the technical aspects of the tolling 
scheme (for example the toll rate, use of toll revenues, boundary limits, etc.) are important, 
political will is also crucial.  As Sumalee (2001) found from interviews with local officials in the 
UK considering the implementation of congestion pricing, policymakers often emphasize public 
acceptance as a decision criteria.  Similarly, in discussing the possible extension of the London 
Congestion Charging Scheme, Santos and Fraser (2006) note that political factors, and more 
specifically constituent views, should be an important element in any policy decision of that 
magnitude.  
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Given that the public, through voting and other forms of political behavior, can (and 
should) influence decisions to toll, it is important to understand the factors that shape public 
support for tolling.  Specifically, what makes the public more or less willing to pay tolls? 
Most of the empirical work explaining public support for tolling has modeled stated 
preferences (rather than revealed preferences), relying on expressed acceptance of (or support 
for) tolling. We adopt a similar stated preferences approach, but focus instead on expressed 
willingness-to-pay a toll, which is one step beyond simply accepting or supporting a toll. 
Controlling for income as a constraint on willingness to pay, this study proffers a model of 
willingness-to-pay tolls that includes concern for the community as well as political and 
environmental beliefs. Thus, it relates support for tolling to existing community values and 
concerns in the broader social setting.    
 
2. A model for explaining willingness-to-pay tolls 
As stated above, this study seeks to identify the factors that influence individuals’ 
willingness-to-pay a substantial $3 flat rate toll to bypass delays at tunnels by using an express 
lane that would be free of delays the majority of the time. We develop and test a model that 
builds on previous work on road pricing and environmental taxes (Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011; 
Rienstra, Rietveld, & Verhoef, 1999; Schade & Baum, 2007; Schade & Schlag, 2003).  
Using traditional political economy as a starting point, individuals should be willing to 
pay a toll if the toll (and the subsequent benefits) maximizes their expected utility. However, we 
argue that this utility is not solely a function of direct congestion relief in time saved to the 
respondent, but instead also arises from (a) the relative cost of the tolls based on income and 
frequency of use, (b) concern for the community including its economic health,  and (c) liberal 
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beliefs including trust in government and a concern for the environment. We propose a four-
factor model for explaining willingness-to-pay tolls (summarized in Figure 1).  The first two 
factors reflect the individual’s perception of the personal consequences of the tax.  These factors 
are motivated by the individual’s self-interest and are closely associated with (a) the direct 
benefits the individual may receive from the toll, and (b) the relative costs imposed by the toll 
that the individual must bear. The third factor is the individual’s concern for the broader 
community and for the greater good.  The final factor of the model reflects the individual’s 
political and environmental leanings, including trust in government.     
[Figure 1 Here] 
The four factors and their respective variables are discussed next and summarized in 
Table 1.  Using this model, we explain willingness-to-pay tolls as a function of these variables: 
congestion, tunnel delay, commute time, use of transit, future residential tenure, perception of 
economic condition, road/congestion problems, income, frequency of tunnel travel, political 
liberalism, environmental liberalism, trust in government and demographic factors.  
[Table 1 Here] 
 
2.1 Direct benefits to the respondent 
Research shows that support for, and subsequent willingness-to-pay, tolls is related to 
personal benefits perceived by users and non-users (Schade & Schlag, 2003; Zmud & Arce, 
2008).  Specifically, when a concrete benefit is linked to the idea of tolling or charging for road 
usage, for example the reduction of congestion, support for tolling is higher  (Hårsman & 
Quigley, 2010; Zmud & Arce, 2008).  Zettel and Carll (1964) propose that implementation of 
road pricing would affect individuals according to three categories: (a) Tolled – those who pay 
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the  price because their high values of time and reliability make them better off paying; (b) 
Tolled-off – Those who divert to parallel arterials or transit, since their gains from the toll are not 
worth the high cost; (c) Untolled – those already on the parallel arterials.  Those individuals in 
the Tolled group would experience direct benefits from the tolled facility and would be expected 
to be willing to pay the toll.  The second and third groups, however, may perceive themselves as 
losers from road pricing and therefore exhibit less willingness to pay the toll. But, many in the 
second and third groups could support the toll either because they do not (or rarely) pay or 
because they believe it confers other benefits they value, such as pollution reduction or needed 
revenue for the local government.   
Those who have experienced delay and congestion are more likely to be in the Tolled 
category, and may be more willing to pay a toll in exchange for an improved driving experience. 
But, their expectations of benefit may depend on  their travel behavior, travel experiences, and 
travel characteristics. We expect, therefore, to find that experience with congestion and delays 
will lead to higher support for tolling (Jones, 1998; Schade & Baum, 2007; Steg, 2003).  In 
addition, as most individuals value their commuting time,  an anticipated decrease in commute 
time will increase the willingness-to-pay tolls (Hårsman & Quigley, 2010; Podgorski & 
Kockelman, 2006). One other factor might also influence support for tolling. Transit users may 
evince greater support for tolling, as they are less likely to routinely pay the toll, yet benefit from 
the reduction in congestion on the occasions when they do use the toll facility (e.g., to be on time 
for a doctor’s appointment).  Odeck and Bråthen (1997) found that those who commute using 
transit are less negative about tolling than those who commute via automobile.   
 
2.2 Relative cost  
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The same research on the personal benefits of tolls also suggests that willingness-to-pay 
is related to the costs borne by the individual. However, rather than absolute cost, we focus on 
the relative cost of the toll.  The relative cost associated with a toll may decline for the individual 
as his or her income rises. Thus, as the value of time studies show, the willingness-to-pay may be 
a function of personal income with the more affluent indicating greater willingness-to-pay.  
Research on the relationship between income and willingness-to-pay tolls is largely conflicting, 
with some research finding a positive connection between income and willingness to pay while 
others find no connection (see for example Odeck & Bråthen, 1997; Rienstra, et al., 1999; 
Schade & Schlag, 2003; Verhoef, Nijkamp, & Rietveld, 1997).  The absence of a clear 
relationship may be due to the fact that frequent users, no matter their income, pay more over 
time.  In fact, opposition to tolling and congestion pricing may be a function of its impact on 
disposable income as well as of its effect on total income. We include a measure of frequency of 
use of the tunnel to test the possibility that frequent use, along with income, will influence the 
willingness to pay; higher income is expected to increase willingnes-to-pay, while greater 
frequency of use is expected  to depress willingness-to-pay.  
 
2.3 Community concern 
In their study of willingness-to-pay for government services, Simonsen and Robbins 
(1999) found evidence of a “halo” effect, where those who consumed more services had higher 
willingness-to-pay for collectively consumed services, expressing greater preferences to pay for 
the greater good.  The same can be argued for tolling and road pricing, as support may be driven 
by concerns greater than those directly related to self, such as concerns for the community, 
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broader policy concerns about problems facing the local area, and concerns regarding the 
economy in general. 
Research finds that support for tolls increases with public awareness of problems with 
congestion. Those who view congestion as a problem for their community are more likely to 
endorse measures to alleviate it (Jaensirisak, et al., 2005; Verhoef, et al., 1997) . Concern for the 
community is also evident in several studies that find many people who do not use public transit 
will support a tax to fund it, when they see it as serving the needs of the poor and elderly 
(Brodsky & Thompson, 1993; Dill & Weinstein, 2007).  It is possible that the longer the 
individual plans to stay in the community (future residential tenure), the greater the concern for 
the good of the community.  This could result in increased willingness-to-pay, as would the 
belief that traffic and congestion is a serious problem in the community. Tolls and road pricing 
may also be more acceptable for those individuals who already perceive transportation-related 
problems, particularly traffic congestion, as major problems facing their community. 
 In addition, because road pricing and tolls impose economic costs on communities, the 
willingness-to-pay tolls may be influenced by the individual’s perception of the broader 
economic condition.  The more positive the perception of the economic outlook, the less likely 
the individual will be to believe the toll will have a negative impact on the community’s 
economic wellbeing and, therefore, the greater the likelihood of support for the toll.  
 
2.4 Political and environmental liberalism 
Political ideology  may also influence the individual’s willingness-to-pay (Hårsman & 
Quigley, 2010). In the U.S., opposition to tolling apparently stems from right-wing populism and 
conservative concerns over high levels of taxation, infringement on individual liberty, and 
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government coercion.  Therefore, political ideologies that lean toward Republican  positions or 
Conservatism may contribute to greater opposition to tolling and less willingness-to-pay such 
tolls. Conversely, those with more liberal beliefs tend to be less opposed to government activism, 
taxes, and policies designed to induce more sustainable behavior (Inglehart, 1997). Those with 
more liberal beliefs about the environment tend to identify with the Democrat Party. We expect, 
therefore, that individuals whose political leanings tend toward the Democrat Party and a Liberal 
ideology to express greater willingness-to-pay tolls.  
In reducing traffic and delays (and possibly even discouraging some driving) tolls may, 
as a byproduct, reduce automobile emissions causing some to view tolls as environmentally 
beneficial.  While congestion pricing and tolling neither have an explicit environmental goal nor 
are intended to address environmental externalities, they have been associated with some 
environmental benefits.   Jaensirisak et al. (2005) found that the single most important 
contributor to increased support for tolling (and road pricing more broadly)  was its presumed 
environmental benefits.  
Lack of support for tolls could be due to general lack of trust in government, possibly 
associated with the public having no clear idea of how government resources are spent or the 
belief that government funds are being spent wastefully. In Europe, Hamilton (2012) found that 
low trust was associated with opposition to congestion pricing. O’Connell and Yusuf (2011) also 
acknowledge the importance of trust when it comes to the issue of transportation taxes and user 
charges.  They proposed a model for presenting proposals to increase taxes and charges that 
includes overt measures to increase trust, such as dedicating the revenue to a specific project.  
Therefore, it is possible that those who express greater trust in government will be more 
supportive of a toll. Schmöcker et al. (2011) note that the individual’s attitude toward the 
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government, and trust specifically, also influences acceptance of an environmental tax (which 
road pricing is sometimes considered), and find that trust in government has both direct and 
indirect effects on acceptance. The general assertion is that individuals who trust their 
government are more likely to support its policies (Hardin, 1999). 
 In sum, we include three indicators of political and environmental liberalism in our 
model: trust in government, environmental liberalism, and political liberalism. We expect all to 
be positive predictors of willingness-to-pay tolls.  
 
2.5 Demographic controls 
In addition to the four factors, we include demographic controls in our analysis.  While 
the “current evidence about the socioeconomic differences in the reaction towards urban road 
pricing is inconclusive” (Gehlert, Kramer, Nielsen, & Schlag, 2011), some consistent findings 
have been found in the literature. For example, research has found that women are more likely 
than men to support road pricing (Golob, 2001; Hårsman & Quigley, 2010; Podgorski & 
Kockelman, 2006).  However,  Podgorski and Kockelman (2006) found that older individuals are 
more likely to support tolls, while Odeck and Bråthren (1997) found younger individuals to be 
more supportive of tolling.  We also include race as a control variable, as previous research 
suggests that African Americans (and other minority groups) are less likely than whites to drive 
(Massey & Denton, 1993) and those who drive less often may be more supportive of tolling.  
 
3. Methodology 
This study relies on data from the Life in Hampton Roads Survey designed and 
administered by the Old Dominion University Social Science Research Center (Old Dominion 
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University Social Science Research Center, 2011).  The survey was designed to gather a 
comprehensive description of community concerns. It consisted of 76 questions about media and 
news consumption; arts, culture, and travel; quality of life; transportation; local and state 
government and political issues; environmental issues; health and education; housing; spirituality 
and well-being; neighborhood issues and crime; military life; and basic demographic 
information.  The survey was conducted using a computer assisted telephone interviewing 
system.  A random digit dial telephone sample comprised of telephone numbers with Hampton 
Roads exchanges was used.  A cellphone sample was also utilized based on switch points within 
the Hampton Roads area.  Calls were conducted from May through July 2011.  A total of 730 
completed interviews were obtained.  After accounting for missing data, the sample for analysis 
was reduced to 693.1 Responses represented all seven cities in the region referred to as Hampton 
Roads, Virginia (Norfolk, Virginia Beach, Chesapeake, Suffolk, Portsmouth, Newport News and 
Hampton).  
The survey asked this question: “To bypass delays at tunnels in Hampton Roads would 
you be willing to pay a toll of $3 to use an express lane, which would be free of delays the 
majority of the time.” (A $3 toll had been under consideration as a remedy for congestion at the 
tunnels.) The response categories were: Yes, No, or Maybe. The dependent variable—
willingness to pay tolls—is derived from this question. The yes and maybe responses were 
collapsed into one category—those expressing some willingness to pay the toll. Given the 
dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, logit regression is used to analyze the predictors 
of willingness to pay.   
The logit regression models willingness-to-pay (WTP) as: 
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WTP  = f(direct benefits, relative cost, community concern, political/environmental liberalism,  
                demographics) 
= f(congestion, tunnel delay, commute time, use transit, income, tunnel travel, future  
      residential tenure, economic condition, congestion problems, political liberalism  
      trust in government, environmental liberalism, male, white, age, employed)  
 
4. Results 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the logit regression, presenting the logit coefficients 
(unstandardized and standardized), odds ratios, and respective p-values. Some, but not all, of the 
independent variables in each factor category are significant. Overall, the model is relatively 
strong with good predictive ability. The McFadden’s adjusted pseudo-R2 is 0.728 and the model 
correctly classified the outcome 95.53 percent of the time, correctly predicting the ‘yes/maybe’ 
outcome 90.85%  of the time and the ‘no’ outcome 96.98% of the time. 
There are four indicators of direct benefits in the model, two of which are significant 
predictors of willingness to pay the toll: personal experience with congestion (p < .0001) and use 
of transit (p < .01).  Experience of tunnel delay was a positive predictor, which approached 
significance (p = .105). Commute time was a negative predictor and insignificant. 
  Two of the three indicators of community concern reached statistical significance, but 
one unexpectedly was a negative predictor. The positive predictor was an optimistic opinion 
about economic conditions (p < .01). The negative predictor was the perception that traffic 
congestion was the biggest problem facing the region.  It is possible that this is reflects concerns 
about the severity of the congestion problem and the negative relationship may arise out of the 
     17 
belief that tolls alone would not address the broader congestion problems in the region.  Future 
residential tenure was not significant. 
 Both variables representing the relative cost factor were significant predictors and in the 
expected direction.  Higher income respondents were more willing to pay the toll (p < .05) and 
frequent users of the tunnel were less willing (p < .001). 
 In terms of the political and environmental liberalism factor, greater trust in government 
was a significant positive predictor (p < .0001) of greater willingness to pay tolls while concern 
for the environment decreases the likelihood of being willing to pay tolls (p < .05).  This result is 
surprising as tolls and congestion pricing are sometimes viewed as being environmentally-related 
(such as reducing emissions from less idling and driving). However, environmental liberalism as 
measured in this study reflects concerns over sea level rise and climate change, and may not be 
as closely linked to issues such as air pollution that may be more directly related to attitudes and 
beliefs about transportation.  Furthermore, tolls are often not implemented with environmental 
objectives in mind and rarely produce significant environmental benefits.  
 Finally, only one of the demographic variables was a significant predictor. White 
respondents were more willing to pay the toll (p < .0001).  The lack of significance of other 
demographic variables such as age and gender mirror the generally inconclusive findings of 
previous research.  
[Table 2 Here] 
 Table 2 also presents the fully-standardized logit coefficients which take into account the 
standard deviations of the independent and dependent variables.  These standardized coefficients, 
similar to standardized beta coefficients in linear regression, allow for comparison of the strength 
of the respective independent variables on the willingness-to-pay tolls.  In decreasing order of 
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influence on willingness-to-pay tolls, the variables are:  frequency of tunnel use, experience with 
congestion, being white, perceptions of economic condition, trust in government, income, 
concern for road/congestion, environmental liberalism, and use of transit.  
Overall, the results of the logit regression indicate support for the traditional argument 
that direct benefits and costs drive support for and willingness-to-pay tolls.  The results also 
support our argument that individuals’ willingness-to-pay tolls are motivated, in part, by 
concerns for the greater community and by political and environmental beliefs.  The findings 
provide validation for our four-factor model of willingness-to-pay that extends beyond direct 
benefits and costs to include other concerns and beliefs.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study proposed and tested an explanatory model of willingness-to-pay tolls that 
includes four factors: (a) direct benefit; (b) relative cost; (c) community concern; and (d) political 
and environmental liberalism.  The results offer support for our four factor model. While not 
every indicator was a significant predictor of willingness to pay, each of the four factors had a 
significant indicator. Thus, like Hamilton’s (2012) research in Europe on support for congestion 
pricing, the results suggest that support for tolls is more than a function of direct interest and the 
time value of money, a measure related to income. Tolls are a type of user tax and attitudes 
toward the role of government in the life of the community influence the willingness to pay taxes 
as do variables relating to lifestyle and values. In addition to direct benefit and relative cost we 
have identified two other factors at work: concern for the community and political and 
environmental liberalism. The similarity of our results to Hamilton’s suggests that the four factor 
model might apply in Europe as well as the United States. 
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Only one of our indicators of liberalism was significant—trust in government. Hamilton 
had two direct measures of liberal attitudes that were significant predictors of willingness to 
support congestion pricing—belief that traffic damages the environment and belief that more 
resources should be devoted to the environment. Future research could use these as indicators of 
liberalism, especially environmental liberalism. It may be the case that the liberal respondents in 
this study did not view the toll as an environmental reform. Moreover, some liberals may 
interpret the toll as unfair to low income drivers.  
The survey did not have a measure of the value of time. However, income appears to 
have served as a useful substitute. The combination of income and frequency of tunnel use 
appears to tease out the importance of the toll’s impact on disposable income, implying that 
those who pay the fee on a regular basis are thinking of the toll’s impact on the family budget. 
This is a finding consistent with the impact of family size on willingness to pay. Hamilton 
(2012), for example found that people with children were less supportive of congestion pricing 
even after he controlled for value of time and income. Our finding that transit users are more 
supportive of tolling has been found in other studies.  
In summation, this article makes three inter-related contributions to the study of tolling. 
First, by connecting the multiple benefits of tolling to different types of supporters as well as 
different reasons for support, it locates potential support for tolling in the broader community 
including  political liberals, those who pay it infrequently, as well as those who rely on transit. It 
documents that many who are unlikely to pay the toll on a regular basis may support it for other 
reasons. Thus support for tolling can be studied as more than a function of an individual’s 
monetary value of time. Second, our four factor model has the implicit advantage of viewing 
tolling as a tax as well as a user fee. Thus, many residents can be seen as potentially supporting a 
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toll as a way to improve community life, as tolling can also generate support through the revenue 
it raises, which can be legally dedicated to services the public favors. In both the U.S. and 
Europe, the public is more likely to support a tax or toll when the revenue raised is dedicated 
(sometimes referred to as hypothecating or earmarking) to a purpose the public deems 
important.2 Third, it has implications for studying the political process of building support for 
tolling, as there are a large number of residents who will not need to use the tolled facility on a 
regular basis, who are potential supporters or value the toll for reasons beyond reductions in 
travel time.   
 Another policy implication of our results concerns the opposition of frequent users of the 
tunnel to paying a toll. They appear to view the toll as too costly, given their regular use of the 
tunnel. Perhaps they would be more supportive if frequent users received a significant discount, 
by for example, buying a monthly pass at a reduced rate, such as the rate reductions many central 
city parking lots and authorities provide to commuters.  
 There are two key limitations of this study.  First, the study used a single-price 
assumption with all motorists charged the same rate per mile, resulting in an actual price or cost 
that varies in proportion to time and place (Poole, 2011).  Secondly, we did not specify the trip 
purpose. However, as discussed, researchers have found that the value of time for motorists vary 
greatly, depending on trip purpose and urgency, time of day and week, distinction between 
business travel or leisure travel, and individual preferences (Small, Winston, & Yan, 2006).  We 
are unable to specifically capture these value variations in our study.  Despite this drawback, our 
study offers and establishes a framework or model for explaining willingness-to-pay tolls that 
incorporates factors beyond personal benefits and costs. While this framework appears to work 
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for the case of a single-price toll, future studies could apply and test this model using more 
complicated toll structures.    
 
END NOTES 
1. The missing data were determined to be missing completely at random, and therefore are not 
expected to influence the results and findings.   
2. The impact of dedicating the revenue can be substantial. In a recent study on attitudes toward 
increasing the federal gas tax in the United States, Agrawal et al. (2013) found that support 
for the tax increase rose from 20 to 58 percent when it was earmarked for road maintenance, 
to 54 percent when earmarked for improvements in road safety, and to 49 percent, when 
spent to reduce local air pollution.  
 
REFERENCES Agrawal, A. W., Nixon, H., & Murphy, V. (2013). What Do Americans Think about Federal Tax 
Options to support Public Transit, Highways, and Local Streets and Roads?: Results 
from Year Three of a National Survey. . Paper presented at the 92nd Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC.  Brodsky, D. M., & Thompson, E. (1993). Ethos, Public Choice, and Referendum Voting. Social 
Science Quarterly, 74(2), 286-299.  Dill, J., & Weinstein, A. (2007). How to Pay for Transportation? A Survey of Public Preferences in California. Transport Policy, 14(4), 346-356.  Eliasson, J., & Jonsson, L. (2011). The Unepected "Yes": Explanatory Factors Behind the Positive Attitudes to Congestion Charges in Stockholm. Transport Policy, 18(4), 636-647.  Federal Highway Administration. (2011, July 2011). Toll Facilities in the United States: Bridges-Roads-Tunnels-Ferries. FHWA-PL-11-032  Retrieved July 29, 2012, from http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/tollpage/ Gaunt, M., Rye, T., & Allen, S. (2007). Public Acceptability of Road User Charging: The Case of Edinburgh and the 2005 Referendum. Transport Reviews, 27(1), 85-102. doi: 10.1080/01441640600831299 Gehlert, T., Kramer, C., Nielsen, O. A., & Schlag, B. (2011). Socioeconomic Differences in Public Acceptability and Car Use Adaptation Towards Urban Road Pricing. Transport 
Policy, 18(5), 685-694. doi: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2011.01.003 
     22 
Golob, T. F. (2001). Joint Models of Attitudes and Behavior in Evaluation of the San Diego I-15 Congestion Pricing Project. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 
35, 495-514.  Hamilton, C. J. (2012). Decisive Factors for the Acceptability of Congestion Pricing. CTS 
Working Paper, from http://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:557543/FULLTEXT01.pdf Hardin, R. (1999). Do You Want to Trust in Government? In M. E. Warren (Ed.), Democracy 
and Trust (pp. 22-41). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hårsman, B., & Quigley, J. M. (2010). Political and public acceptability of congestion pricing: Ideology and self-interest. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 29(4), 854-874. doi: 10.1002/pam.20529 Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political 
Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jaensirisak, S., Wardman, M., & May, A. D. (2005). Explaining Variations in Public Acceptability of Road Pricing Schemes. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 
39(2), 127-153.  Jones, P. (1998). Urban Road Pricing: Public Acceptability and Barriers to Implementation. In K. J. Button & E. T. Verhoef (Eds.), Road Pricing, Traffic Congestion and the 
Environment. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Kallbekken, S., & Sælen, H. (2011). Public acceptance for environmental taxes: Self-interest, environmental and distributional concerns. Energy Policy, 39(5), 2966-2973. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2011.03.006 Massey, D., & Denton, N. (1993). American Aparthied: Segregation and the Making of the 
Underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. O'Connell, L., & Yusuf, J.-E. (2011). An Information Model to Present Proposals to Increase Taxes: Two Examples in the Context of American Values. International Journal of 
Public Administration, 34, 180-189.  Odeck, J., & Bråthen, S. (1997). On Public Attitudes toward Implementation of Toll Roads—The Case of Oslo Toll Ring. Transport Policy, 4(2), 73-83. doi: 10.1016/s0967-070x(97)00008-5 Old Dominion University Social Science Research Center. (2011). 2011 Life in Hampton Roads Survey  Retrieved July 29, 2012, from http://al.odu.edu/ssrc/LIHR_2010-2011_Comparison_Write-UpTABLES.pdf Podgorski, K. V., & Kockelman, K. M. (2006). Public Perceptions of Toll Roads: A Survey of the Texas Perspective. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 40(10), 888-902. doi: 10.1016/j.tra.2006.03.002 Poole, R. W., Jr. . (2011). Rethinking the Politics of Freeway Congestion Pricing. 
Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 2221, 57-63. doi: 10.3141/2221-07 Rienstra, S. A., Rietveld, P., & Verhoef, E. T. (1999). The Social Support for Policy Measures in Passenger Transport: A Statistical Analysis for the Netherlands. Transportation 
Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 4(3), 181-200. doi: 10.1016/s1361-9209(99)00005-x Rusch, W. A. (1984). Toll Highway Financing NCHRP Synthesis of Highway Practice No. 117. Washington, D.C.: Transportation Research Board. 
     23 
Santos, G., & Fraser, G. (2006). Road pricing: lessons from London. Economic Policy, 21(46), 263-310.  Schade, J., & Baum, M. (2007). Reactance or Acceptance? Reactions towards the Introduction of Road Pricing. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 
41(1), 41-48.  Schade, J., & Schlag, B. (2003). Acceptability of Urban Transport Pricing Strategies. 
Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, 6(1), 45-61. doi: 10.1016/s1369-8478(02)00046-3 Schmöcker, J.-D., Pettersson, P., & Fujii, S. (2011). Comparative Analysis of Proximal and Distal Determinants for the Acceptance of Coercive Charging Policies in the UK and Japan. International Journal of Sustainable Transportation, 6(3), 156-173. doi: 10.1080/15568318.2011.570856 Shrank, D., Eisele, B., & Lomax, T. (2012). Texas Transportation Institute's 2012 Urban Mobility Report  Retrieved June 28, 2013, from http://mobility.tamu.edu/ums/ Simonsen, B., & Robbins, M. D. (1999). The Benefit Equity Principle and Willingness to Pay for City Services. Public Budgeting & Finance, 90-110.  Small, K. A., Winston, C., & Yan, J. (2006). Differentiated Road Pricing, Express Lanes, and Carpools: Exploiting Heterogeneous Preferences in Policy Design. Brookings-
Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, 53-96.  Steg, L. (2003). Factors Influencing Acceptability and Effectiveness of Transport Pricing. In J. Schade & B. Schlag (Eds.), Acceptability of Transport Pricing Strategies (pp. 187-202). Boston: Elsevier. Sumalee, A. (2001). Analysing the design criteria of charging cordons. Working Paper 560, from http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/2066/ Verhoef, E. T., Nijkamp, P., & Rietveld, P. (1997). The Social Feasibility of Road Pricing: A Case Study for the Randstad area. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 31(3), 255-276.  Vickrey, W. S. (1969). Congestion Theory and Transport Investment. The American 
Economic Review, 59(2), 251-260.  Wardman, M., & Nicolás Ibáñez, J. (2012). The congestion multiplier: Variations in motorists’ valuations of travel time with traffic conditions. Transportation Research 
Part A: Policy and Practice, 46(1), 213-225. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2011.06.011 Zettel, R. M., & Carll, R. R. (1964). The Basic Theory of Efficiency Tolls: The Tolled, the Tolled-Off, and the Un-Tolled. Highway Research Record, 47, 46-65.  Zmud, J., & Arce, C. (2008). Compilation of Public Opinion Data on Tolls and Road Pricing (Vol. 277). Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board.  
  
     24 














•Frequency of tunnel 
travel (-)
Community Concerns










•Trust in government (+)
     25 
Table 1  Factors and Variables (N=693) 




Willing to pay toll of $3 to use an express lane that would be free of 
delays. 0 (No), 1 (Yes/maybe) 
0.237 0.425 
Congestion Index based on agreement (0-No, 1-Yes) with: 
a) Traffic congestion in Hampton Roads during the morning peak (6-
9am) is a major problem for me. 
b) Traffic congestion in Hampton Roads during the evening peak (3-
6pm) is a major problem for me. 
c) Within the past month, did you avoid visiting a business in a 
neighboring city due to concerns about traffic congestion? 
Ranges from 0 (congestion is not a problem) to 3 (congestion is a major 
problem) 
1.931 1.104 
Tunnel delay Have experienced some delays at tunnels. 0 (No), 1 (Yes)  0.903 0.296 
Commute time How long is your average one-way commute, in minutes, to work or 
school? 
22.831 13.294 
Use transit In the past week, have you used public transportation (including buses or 









Perceptions of the region’s economic conditions and the country’s 




Traffic congestion or roads/bridges maintenance are the biggest problem 
facing the region today. 0 (No), 1 (Yes) 
0.206 0.405 
Income Family household income. Values: 1 (less than $10,000), 2 (more than 
$10,000 to $20,000),  3 (more than $20,000 to $30,000), 4 (more than 
$30,000 to $40,000),  5 (more than $40,000 to $50,000),  6 (more than 
$50,000 to $60,000),  7 (more than $60,000 to $70,000),  8 (more than 
$70,000 to $80,000),  9 (more than $80,000 to $90,000),  10 (more than 




How often have you traveled through a tunnel in Hampton Roads during 
the last month? 2 (once or twice), 3 (3-4 times), 4 (5-6 times), 5 (more 




Index based on: 
a) Democrat political party affiliation (0-No, 1-Yes) 
b) Liberal political ideology (0-No, 1-Yes) 
c) Support for the Tea Party movement (0-Yes, 1-No) 
Ranges from 0 (low) to 3 (high) 
1.560 0.837 
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Environmental 
liberalism 
Index based on agreement with the following: 
a) Global warming is an environmental problem 
b) Rising sea levels in the rest of the world is a concern 





Index based on agreement (0-No, 1-Yes) with: 
a) Most of the time  the local government can be trusted to do what is 
right 
b) Local government uses public resources wisely 
c) State government uses public resources wisely 
Ranges from 0 (low) to 3 (high) 
0.297 0.580 
Male 0.214 0.410 
White 0.266 0.442 
Age 49.935 11.740 
Employed 0.430 0.495 
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Table 2  Logistic Regression of Willingness-to-pay Tolls  






Direct Benefits  
Congestion 1.541 
(0.333) 
4.671 0.446 <0.0001 + 
Tunnel delay 1.327 
(0.819) 
3.769 0.103 0.105 + 
Commute time -0.030 
(0.023) 
0.971 -0.104 0.202 + 
Use transit 5.004 
(1.856) 
149.003 0.086 0.007 + 
Community Concerns  
Future residential tenure -0.829 
(0.905) 
0.436 -0.109 0.359 + 
Economic condition  1.649 
(0.590) 
5.201 0.316 0.005 + 
Road/congestion problems -1.249 
(0.589) 
0.287 -0.133 0.034 + 
Relative Costs  
Income 0.303 
(0.137) 
1.354 0.251 0.027 + 
Frequency of tunnel travel -1.240 
(0.386) 
0.289 -0.458 0.001 - 
Political & Environmental Liberalism  
Political liberalism -0.248 
(0.313) 
0.781 -0.054 0.429 + 
Environmental liberalism -0.986 
(0.427) 
0.373 -0.131 0.021 + 
Trust in government 1.663 
(0.318( 




0.828 -0.020 0.800  
White 2.879 
(0.697) 
17.788 0.334 <0.0001  
Age -.0034 
(0.019) 
0.967 -0.104 0.072  
Employed -0.905 
(0.692) 
0.404 -0.118 0.191  
Constant -1.651 
(1.934) 
  0.393  
N 693     
Χ2 584.35   <0.0001  
Pseudo-R2 0.771     
McFadden's Adjusted R2 0.728     
 
